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Abstract 
TRANSPETRO (Petrobras Transporte S.A.) undertakes oil, products, ethanol, biofuels, and natural gas pipeline 
transportation and storage activities. It is in charge of more than 14,000 kilometers of pipelines - among oil and gas 
pipelines - which interconnect all Brazilian regions and supply the country's most remote points. 
Currently, TRANSPETRO, through its National Operational Control Center (CNCO), undertakes the operations and 
monitoring of more than 91% of liquid transportation pipelines and distribution lines and 100% of natural gas pipelines for 
the Brazilian state company, PETROBRAS, and private companies. 
The centralization of TRANSPETRO’s pipelines and terminals operations, started by 2002 with the creation of its Control 
Center, which uses SCADA technology, changed substantially the way the company operates its pipelines. This decision 
required a very large cultural change and breaking of paradigms. 
In addition to requirements for better operational reliability, which involves SCADA Technology and its supporting 
infrastructure (Electric, Air-conditioning, Fire Detection and Extinguishing, etc), it were also introduced reliability 
requirements in processes management of the operation and human reliability. In this context, the CNCO is part of the triad 
of Reliability, covering the segments of the operational, technological and human process. 
Considering this context, the present work will describe the Program for Business Continuity Management (BCM), which is 
now being implemented in TRANSPETRO. Methodology and guidelines established for Managing Business Continuity 
and Incident Response (Crisis Management), focusing on CNCO, using as a 'benchmark' the BSI 2231-3 [1]. 
As a result of the BCM program on the CNCO, will be presented some evidence such as: the benefits arising from the 
implementation of the Business Impact Analysis (BIA); Qualitative Risk Assessment, based at the FRAAP methodology 
and a sample of the system used to evaluate the level of maturity (stages) of the implementation of the program, considering 
as benchmark BSI-2231-3 (BSI PAS 56) Examples of the various documents that make up the BCM will be showed. 
It will also be presented, a summary of the SCADA architecture, and, as an example, the process of assessing the level of 
maturity of the model Maintenance Management and Administration applied to SCADA Technology, based on heuristic 
model, developed by professionals responsible for SCADA, as one of the solutions that can be used, among others, to 
ensure business continuity. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Objective of this work 
Specify requirements for planning, establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining 
and continuous improvement of a BCMS - Business Continuity Management System - documented within the 
risk management context, focusing on TRANSPETRO´s National Operational Control Center (CNCO), 
developing its resilience, in other words, ‘The ability of recognizing and being capable of handling unexpected 
events, that impose the review of whatever has been conceived and established in terms of values and demands 
in terms of all management processes, strategies and policies that have been in use.’(Woods, 2005[2]; 
Hollnagel, 2004) [3].  
Figure 1. Partial view of TRANSPETRO´S National Operational Control Center - CNCO
2. The Scada Technology
The CNCO uses its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) to control and monitor the 
pipeline operations of the company. This system controls the huge majority of terminals, pumping and 
compressors stations and pipelines (oil and natural gas) operated by the company. They are tasks of CNCO: 
start and stop pumps and compressors, open and close valves, control over output and input volumes in the 
several operational areas, and keep the operational variables within of expected process limits. Figure 2 shows 
the architecture of CNCO SCADA system. 
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Figure 2.  TRANSPETRO´S Scada System Architecture 
3. The BCM program 
3.1. Definition of BCM system 
‘Holistic management process that identifies potential threats to the organization and the impacts to business 
operations, that those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests  of its key 
stakeholders, reputation, brand and value creating activities’ (BS 25999-2006) [4]
3.2. Incident Response Plan Overview 
This incident management plan establishes the recommended organization, actions, and procedures needed to: 
 Recognize and respond to an incident;  
 Assess the situation quickly and effectively;  
 Notify the appropriate individuals and organizations about the incident;  
 Organize the CNCO’s response activities, including activating a command center;  
 Escalate the company’s response efforts based on the severity of the incident; and  
 Support the business recovery efforts being made in the aftermath of the incident. 
3.3. Stages of implementation 
ƒ Reference Requirements: ( ABNT NBR-15999) [5]. 
ƒ Document elaborated: Methodology and guidelines for the implementation of BCM – Reference: 
BCM Workbook - Business Continuity Management and Risk Management and Crisis [9] 
ƒ Document Elaborated: Manual for Business Continuity Managing and Response Incident, with the 
following structure: 
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Section 1 – Plan Body (overview, scope, scenarios, recovery objectives, assumptions, etc) 
Section 2 – Incident Response and Management (committee manager, definition of teams and 
definition of responsibilities and checklist of tasks, etc) 
Section 3 - Notification and Disaster Declaration (Notification Process Overview,  CNCO 
Team Notification and Notification of Internal and External Client, Vendor and 
Business Partner. Activating a Crisis Operations Center, etc) 
Section 4 - List of Contacts, Checklists for Response and Actions to incidents 
Section 5 - Checklist for response and Specific Actions to Incidents 
Section 6 - Exercising, Maintaining and Auditing BCM (Training and awareness, Exercising 
BCM, Maintenance Program BCM and Audit) 
Section 7 - Incident Management Forms 
Section 8 – Attachments, References, Norms and Standards 
ƒ Identification of processes and / or activities that support key products and services (MCAs – 
Mission Critical Activities) 
ƒ Development and implementation of BIA Questionnaire (Business Impact Analysis), to evaluate the 
impacts that may result in the cessation of each activity or function of the key processes (MCAs – 
Mission Critical Activities) 
ƒ Quantitative Risk Assessment carried out using the methodology FRAAP [7] – Facilited Risk 
Analysis and Assessment process 
ƒ Established for each MCA (Mission Critical Activities), maximum periods of stopped or recovery 
time objective (RTO) 
ƒ Categorization of each MCA, according to a priority established for recovery 
ƒ Identification of relevant dependencies and support resources for prioritized activities, including 
suppliers, partners and other relevant stakeholders (internal Customer x External Client) 
ƒ To suppliers and external / internal partners, with MCAs related to CNCO, it was determined the 
response readiness and strategies for maintaining continuity of CNCO 
ƒ Estimate resources that each MCAs will requires for their recovery. 
ƒ Development of Recovery Specific Plans, according to the scenarios raised in the BIA 
  
3.4. Samples of some stages of work developed for the implementation of BCM in CNCO
Figure. 3 - BIA x Risk Assessment using Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process – FRAAP [7]. 
      
Magnitude of 
Impact CNCO IMPACT ASSESSMENT x SCENARIO
Catastrophic (C) (C) - Disruption of Centralized Operation (CNCO Headquarters and Backup)
High (A1) (A1) - Disruption of Centralized Operation (CNCO Headquarters)
High (A2) (A2) - Disruption of Centralized Operation (CNCO Backup)
High (A3) (A3) - Disruption of Oil Scada System (CNCO Headquarters or Backup)
High (A4) (A4) - Disruption of Gas Scada System (CNCO Headquarters or Backup)
High (A5) (A5) - Degraded Operation with possible support of operational area
Medium (M1)
(M1) - Work overload of technical staff and / or the Operating due to insufficient 
qualified staff for the shift changeover  and / or support Scada and systems 
related. 
Medium (M2) (M2) - Degraded operation of Oil SCADA (Headquarters or Backup).
Medium (M3) (M3) - Degraded operation of Gas SCADA Headquarters or Backup.
Medium (M4) (M4) - Impairment of voice communication flow with operating areas and related 
activities.
Medium (M5)
(M5) - Impairment to integrate new projects or migration Pipelines or equipments 
to CNCO; in the training process (operators and technicians) and Maintenance 
and Administration activity of the Scada System
Low (B1)
(B1) - Disruption in automatic integration of the information from SCADA system 
to corporate systems and / or administrative (BDEMQ; SAG/LOGUM; SAG; PIM; 
etc)
Low (B2) (B2) - Disruption of access to Corporate Systems (Programming; BDEMQ; SAP; PIMS; SINPEP; RTAs; NOTES, Rope; etc)
Low (B3) (B3) - Disruption in access to IT tools for analysis of the operational process and / 
or simulations, for operation
Low (B4) (B4) - Operation in contingency for Alternative Energy System.
Insignificant (I) (I) - It was not associated scenario for this impact.
Almost Certain Catastrophic
Probable High
Possible Medium
Rare Low
Improbable Insignificant
Insignificant Low Medium High Catastrophic
RISK MATRIX FOR MISSION CRITICAL ACTIVITIES - CNCO
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Figure 4.  Annex X – FRAAP Risk Assessment – CNCO 
Annex X - FRAAP RISK Assessment Methodology adapted
SCENARIO x PROCESS   
                      BCM RESPONSIBLE
THREAT (Event) PROBABILITY (P) IMPACT(I)
RISk= P 
x I
1. Mobility, Integrity and acess of key people 
and integrity of the physical Installation and/or 
infraestructure Building related to CNCO
1.1. Mobility and access to key people CNCO - 
insufficiency of qualified effective (Item 1.5.1 of 
PCNRI)
BCM Responsible - OPERATING TEAM Natural Threat
1.1.1 - Storm, Great Flood (M1) Probable M1 *
1.1.2 - Strong Winds (M1) Probable M1 *
1.1.3 - Earthquake ( A1 e A2 ) Improbable C A1 e A2
1.1.4 - Tsunami ( A1 e A2 ) Improbable C A1 e A2
BCM Responsible - OPERATING TEAM Civil Disorder
1.1.5 - General Strike (M1) Probable M1 *
1.1.6 - Agglomeration and mobilizing marches (M1) Probable M1 *
1.1.7 - Try invasion in CNCO Headquarters or Backup dependencies (A1 
ou A2) Possible A1 ou A2 A1 ou A2
1.2. Integrity and access to Installations - 
Buildings; Equipment Rooms, Control Center 
and other rooms related to CNCO - (Item 1.5.1 of 
PCNRI)
Sinister 
BCM Responsible - EGI, Scada and Operating Team1.2.1 - External Fire in the proximity of CNCO (M1) Possible M1 *
1.2.2 - Fire in external facilities or infrastructure affecting operations at 
CNCO (Telecom Sites) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2 *
1.2.3 - Fire in internal facilities or in infrastructure affecting operations at 
CNCO (Equipment and Control Center Room) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
1.2.4 - Gas Leak (A1 ou A2) Possible A1 ou A2
1.2.5 - Destruction of the building infrastructure of CNCO (Headquarters 
or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
1.2.6 - Flooding in SCADA Equipment Rooms, Telecommunications and 
utilities systems (Electrical Systems, Cooling, Fire and Videowall) (A1 or 
A2)
Possible A1 ou A2
Actions of third parties
1.2.7 - Terrorism (I) Improbable Insignificante I
1.2.8 - Sabotage - Personnel unauthorized access in equipment and 
systems rooms (A1 ou A2) Possible A1 ou A2 *
2. People Integrity, effective and Human 
Reliability (Item 1.5.2 of PCNRI)
BCM Responsible - CCO, CCG e SCADA Team 2.1 - Accident with absence Operators groups and / or SCADA Technical (M1) Possible M1 *
2.2 - Epidemics or Outbreak disease (M1) Possible M1 *
2.3 - syndicate strike, Work Action (M1) Probable M1 *
2.4 - Lack of replacement staff trained in business in key processes 
(MCAs) of operation and Scada (M1) Possible M1 *
2.5 - Human Behavioral failure (fatigue, work overload, stress, 
ambience, etc.) (A5) Possible A5
2.6 - Procedural failure (related to training, Information x Knowledge) 
(A5) Possible A5
3. Communication / Telecommunication System 
(Item 1.5.3 of PCNRI)
BCM Responsible - TIC_PB and SCADA Team 3.1 - Critical fault or total loss of WAN Automation Network (Integrated Corporative Network  x  Vsat) (A1 and A2) Rare C A1 e A2
3.2 - Critical Failure or loss of Integrated Corporate Network (Automation 
Network) (A3) Possible A3 *
3.3 - Critical fault or loss of Vsat Satellite Network (Automation Network) 
(M2 and M3 Possible M2 e M3 *
3.4 - Critical fault or loss of fixed telephony system or extension (M4) Possible M4 *
3.5 - Critical fault or loss of access to intranet (corporate applications) (B1 
and B2) Possible B1 e B2 *
3.6 - Critical fault or loss of the operation service of Telecommunication 
Network - CORS) (A1 and A2) Rare C A1 e A2
3.7 - Critical fault or loss of Automation Integrated Corporate Network for 
upgrade or changes in the telecommunications system (A5) Possible A5
3.8 - Critical fault or loss of fixed telphony System or extension for 
upgrade or modification to the system (M4) Possible M4
4.  Automation / SCADA Technology - AT (Item 
1.5.4 of PCNRI) THREAT (Event) PROBABILITY (P)
IMPACT
(I)
RISk =
 P x I
BCM Responsible - SCADA Team 4.1 - Critical fault or total loss of the functions of Oil and Gas SCADA System of CNCO Headquarters and CNCO Backup (A1 and A2) Rare C A1 e A2
4.2 - Critical fault or total loss of the functions of Oil and Gas SCADA 
System of CNCO Headquarters or CNCO Backup (A3 or A4) Possible A3 ou A4
4.3 - Critical fault or total loss of CMX1 / XIS2 Scada Oil Server  
(Headquarters or Backup) (M2) Possible M2 *
4.4 - Critical fault or total loss of CMX2 / XIS1 Scada Oil Server  
(Headquarters or Backup) (M2) Possible M2 *
4.5 - Critical fault or total loss of CMX1 / XIS1 Scada Gas Server  
(Headquarters or Backup) (M3) Possible M3 *
4.6 - Critical fault or total loss of CMX2 / XIS2 Scada Gas Server  
(Headquarters or Backup) (M3) Possible M3 *
4.7 - Critical fault or loss of the Oil Engineering Server (Headquarters or 
Backup) (M2) Possible M2
4.8 - Critical fault or loss of the Gas Engineering Server (Headquarters or 
Backup) (M3) Possible M3
4.9 - Critical fault or total loss of Human Machine Interface Servers of the 
Oil SCADA System (Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
4.10 - Critical fault or total loss of Human Machine Interface Servers of 
the Gas SCADA System (Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
4.11 - Loss of Oil Operations Workstation (Headquarters or Backup) (M2) Possible M2 *
4.12 - Loss of Gas Operations Workstation (Headquarters or Backup) (M3) Possible M3 *
4:13 - Critical fault or total loss Oil and Gas Application Servers CNCO 
Headquarters or CNCO Backup (B1 and B3) Possible B1 e B3
4:14 - Critical fault or total loss of Oil or Gas Database Servers CNCO 
Headquarters or CNCO Backup (B1 and B3) Possible B1 e B3
4:15 - Critical fault or total loss "Gestor" application System 
(Headquarters or Backup) (M2) Possible M2
4:16 - Critical fault or total loss of Oil and Gas Front-End Processor 
Servers - FEP1 and FEP2  (Headquarters and Backup) (A1 and A2) Rare C A1 e A2
4.17 - Critical fault or total loss of Oil Front-End Processor Servers - FEP1 
and FEP2 (Headquarters or Backup) (A3) Possible A3
4.18 - Critical fault or total loss of Gas Front-End Processor Servers - 
FEP1 and FEP2 (Headquarters or Backup) (A4) Possible A4
4.19 - Critical fault or total loss of Oil Front-End Processor Servers - FEP1 
or FEP2 (Headquarters or Backup) (M2) Possible M2 *
4.20 - Critical fault or total loss of Gas Front-End Processor Servers - 
FEP1 or FEP2 (Headquarters or Backup) (M3) Possible M3 *
4:21 - Critical Failure by Upgrade Oil SCADA System (M2) Rare M2
4.22 -  Critical Failure by Upgrade Gas SCADA System (M3) Rare M3
4:23 - Loss of the SCADA Laboratory (M5) Possible M5
4:24 - SCADA System failure in the transfer process of the operations 
between CNCO Headquarters and CNCO Backup (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2 *
BCM Responsible - Process Eng. end CCO
4:25 - Critical Failure or loss of engineering application servers used by 
Process Engineering Activity (Oil and Gas) (B3) Possible B3
4:26 - Critical fault or loss Leak Detection System (M2) Possible M2
BCM Responsible - System Analysts/Eng CCG 
Team
4:27 - Critical fault or loss of specific Applications Systems Servers of the 
Gas Activities (M3) Possible M3
4:28 - Critical fault or total loss of IFIX Scada System (Gas Compressors) 
(A5) Possible A5
5. Information Technology - IT (Item 1.5.5 of 
PCNRI)
BCM Responsible: GETIC and/or SCADA Team 5.1 - Critical fault or loss of Data and/or Application Corporative Servers (B2) Probable B2 *
5.2 - Critical fault or loss of Corporate PC (Windows) of the Operation 
workstation (B2) Probable B2 *
5.3 - Virus (Corporate Network) (A1 or A2) Probable A1 ou A2 *
5.4 - Hacking or unauthorized access (Corporate or Automation  
environment) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
5.5 - Total loss of PCs corporate (Windows) of the CNCO Headquarters or 
CNCO Backup, including activities to support the operation. (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
6. Utility Systems and / or other Equipments   
(Item 1.5.6 of PCNRI)
BCM Responsible: SCADA Team 6.1 - Blackout Electric System (Dealers) (C) Possible C *
6.2 - Lack of power supply of local Dealer (B5) Possible B4 *
6.3 - Critical fault or total loss of UPS(Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2 *
6.4 - Critical fault or total loss of Electrical Panel of the CNCO 
infraestructure (Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
6.5 - Critical fault or total loss of Electric Power Generators 
(Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
6.6 - Critical fault or total loss of air-conditioning (cooling) system 
(Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2 *
6.7 - Critical fault or total loss of FM 200 Detection System (Headquarters 
or Backup) (A1 or A2) Possible A1 ou A2
6.8 - Total Loss of Telephone Recording System (Headquarters or 
backup) (M1) Possible M1 *
6.9 - Lack of Videowall System (Headquarters) (B3) Possible B3 *
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats (restricted use of information)
Other Threats 
Other Thr ats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
Other Threats 
6.1 - Blackout Nation l Electric System (Dealers)      Pos i l         B4
436   Dilmar de Castro Alves and Marcio Manhães Gomes de Almeida /  Procedia Computer Science  55 ( 2015 )  431 – 440 
3.5. Management Committee of Business Continuity 

Incident Management Team (Crisis) - EGI
This team assumes all responsibility for all phases of Incident Management and recovery 
work in CNCO; since the incident statement (disaster) to complete demobilization. EGI is 
composed of the following key leaders of the company and will lead the Incident 
Management and Recovery Plans, within their respective activities, from a Crisis Command 
Center, with the other teams to be formed. EGI and also responsible for managing the 
Program BCM.
EGI Leader EGI Members
Oil Operating Manager Sr Consultant          (Leader of BCM Program)
SCADA Coordinator (1º substitute)
CCO Coordinator     (2º substitute)
Security liaison 
OPERATION (ERIOP) 
This team is responsible for 
implementing the response and 
incident recovery activities, as 
outlined in the Incident Response 
Plan (PRI), developed by the 
Planning Team. The Leader or 
Substitute for this activity reports 
to the Planning Team Leader and 
determines the necessary 
resources and the organizational 
structure within the operations of 
Incident Response Team. 
Name:  
Leader and Substitute 
Members:  
See Table III 
PLANNING (ERIPLAN) 
This Team is responsible 
developing the Incident Action 
Plan which is used to manage the 
incident. They are also 
responsible for the collection, 
evaluating, dissemination, and 
use of information regarding the 
development of the incident and 
the status os resources.
Name:  
Leader and Substitute 
Membrs:  
See Table IV 
ADM/LOGISTIC (ERIAL) 
This Team supports services to 
all incident management and 
Recovery Teams in CNCO and 
is responsible for but not limited 
to the following specific 
funnctions: point Issue costs 
related to CNCO; purchase; 
Control expended man-hour 
involved in the incident; 
Overtime; HR resources; 
handling and hosting staff; 
Interface with Security 
personnel and utility systems 
Maintenance Team 
Name:  
Leader and Substitute 
Membrs: 
See Table V 
Adm. Manager (Condominium)
liaison
GETIC (IT) liaison 
Incident Recovery Executive Team
EADGI
Damage Assessment 
Team and Incident 
Management
CNCO Representatives 
Leader: Sr. Consultant  
Members: Table II 
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3.6. Samples of checklist applied to the BCM Program      
3.7. Samples of forms applied to the BCM Program        
LV.5.1 -  INITIAL INCIDENT RESPONSE CHECKLIST  – EGI  AND EADGI
Incident occurs. 
During non-business hours => Cotur havind been informed of the incident that can affect the 
CNCO, starts the local emergency procedures and notifies the Manager of Pipeline Control 
Center (leader of the Incident Management Team) that following the General Procedure: PG-
0TP-00088 - Contingency Management.  
Both Cotur Oil and Gas, notify their respective Coordinators of the CCO and CCG, the 
Coordinator of the  Telecommunications Operations Center and Services (CORS), the SCADA 
Staff  and shift teams at Headquarters (SMS - Safety environment and health, Maintenance and 
Fire Brigade). 
During  normal business hours  => If the information about the incident was directly to EGI 
Leader or substitute (Manager / Coordinator), they communicate to the Cotur, that follows the 
local emergency procedures. The EGI notifies the SCADA support and  headquarters  staff 
(SMS - Safety environment and health, Maintenance and Fire Brigade), If that support staff has 
not been notified by other authorities. 
If a disaster is declared, the EGI Leader ou his substitute should 
1. Notifies Transpetro's high administration 
2. Notifies the EADGI for inspection of the incident and activates the Crisis Operations 
Center (COC)  
3. Activates Business Continuity Planning and Incident Response 
4. Notifies the leaders of the Executive Team Incident Recovery  – ERIPLAN, ERIOP e 
ERIAL 
5. Launches emergency response procedure 
dŚƌĞĂƚdǇƉĞ
;ĨƌŽŵŶŶĞǆyͿ
/ŵƉĂĐƚ;ĨƌŽŵŶŶĞǆyͿ KďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐͬƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽďĞ
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚϰŚŽƵƌƐ
;ZdKфсϰ,ƐͿ
KďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐͬ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽďĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚϰ
ŚŽƵƌƐ
;ZdKхϰͿ
DƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚďǇ͗
;EĂŵĞĂŶĚ
ZĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶEƵŵďĞƌͿ
6.2 - Critical fault or total loss of the UPS 
(Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2)
A1 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Headquarters) or
A2 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Backup)
6.3 - Critical fault or total loss of Electric 
Panel (Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or A2)
A1 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Headquarters) or
A2 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Backup)
6.4 - Critical fault or total loss of Electric 
Power Generators (Headquarters or 
Backup) (A1 or A2)
A1 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Headquarters) or
A2 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Backup)
Form 1 - Objectives and Strategies for Treatment or Disaster Recovery
Scenario x Process - Asset: Supporting Utilities
a - systematically Audit maintenance management of the  
electrical system and infrastructure , in CNCO Headquarters and 
Backup: apply periodically Predictive Power Quality and 
Thermography and carrying out performing systematic tests, 
through generated graphics, the parameters aquisitados by 
technology; Provide resources in the annual investment plan. 
b - In the directory (BCM / Design / Electrical), archive 
information and documents of the existing project, manuals and 
technical specifications of the equipments; Description Memorial 
(MD) for hiring; suppliers´ information, etc., for quick use.
c - Leave prepared Minutes, to request an appreciation from the 
Law Department for hiring service and / or acquisitions of assets
1 - Scada and 
Operation Team
2 - EGI
a - Scada Team
b, c - Leader of the 
BCM Program and 
Scada Team
d -  Scada Team
1 - Transfer the Operation for 
CNCO Backup or Bring the 
Operation Headquarters, if 
the backup is Operational
2 - Apply BCM Planning
Leader of BCM 
Program
7655500
  D  /
dŚƌĞĂƚdǇƉĞ
;ĨƌŽŵŶŶĞǆyͿ
/ŵƉĂĐƚ;ĨƌŽŵŶŶĞǆyͿ KďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐͬƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽďĞĂƉƉůŝĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨŝƌƐƚϰŚŽƵƌƐ
;ZdKфсϰ,ƐͿ
KďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐͬƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŽďĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚϰ
ŚŽƵƌƐ
;ZdKхϰͿ
DƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚďǇ͗
;EĂŵĞĂŶĚ
ZĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
EƵŵďĞƌͿ
4:24 - SCADA System failure in the transfer 
process of the operations between CNCO 
Headquarters and CNCO Backup (A1 or 
A2)
A1 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Headquarters) or
A2 -  Disruption of Centralized 
Operation (CNCO Backup)
1 - Discuss and set maximum time to abort the 
transfer between Control Centers
2 - Move Operators group from CNCO 
Backup to The CNCO Headquarters or vice 
versa, considering the maximum time xx 
minutes. Estimated average time to return xx 
H: M
3 - vehicles for displacement of the operators 
should be available to the successful transfer. 
a - Discuss strategies to manage the event (Example: centralization of 
information disclosure for Transpetro´s top management and other 
areas of interest, justifying the non-completion of the transfer process, 
which should be systematized in the document body: "CNCO CHECK-
LIST transfer and OPERATION BY THE CNCO BACKUP STATION 
# xx / year " Ex.. agree time to abort the transfer process is: xx minutes.
b - Keep the systematic to make Report (REL-SCADA # xx / year) and 
subsequent critical analysis of the main events during the transfer 
process, to indicate possible improvements (TOR = xx days), including 
the causes which prevented the non-completion of the transfer.
1, 2, 3 - Oil and Gas 
Operation 
Coordinators
a - EGI
b - Oil and Gas 
Operation 
Coordinators and 
Scada Team 
Leader of BCM 
Program
7655500
Form 1 - Objectives and Strategies for Treatment or Disaster Recovery
Scenario x Process - Asset: Automation/SCADA Tecnology
  D  /
Date
Time
Threat Type or Event
(Annex X)
Impact
(Annex X)
Event Location Magnitude of 
Event
Probable Cause "Immediate Action (aligned 
with Recovery Strategy - 
Form 1)
 RTO <= 4 Hours
Complementary Actions 
(aligned with Recovery 
Strategy - Form 1)
 RTO > 4 Hours
Need 
Evacuation
Notification 
of Public 
Agencies
Deaths 
or 
Injured
Access the 
facilities 
(CNCO and 
TIC_PB)
BCM 
Responsible
Information to Stakeholders (public 
interest)
Example 6.3 - Critical fault or total loss of 
UPS(Headquarters or Backup) (A1 or 
A2)
A1 - Disruption of Centralized Operation 
(CNCO Headquarters)
UPS/"No Break" 
Room - CNCO 
Headquarters
1- Do not 
Declared 
Disaster
in analysis 1 - To transfer Operation to 
CNCO Backup
Hiring direct maintenance 
service with the 
manufacturer
N N N Y Scada 
Leader
Informed that for operational safety 
the operation will only return to 
CNCO headquarters after  total 
Form 5 - Incident Report
Date and
Time of 
Event
Threat Type or Event
(Annex X)
Event Location (Rooms or 
shelters)
System or Equipment Condition of use or integrity 
(equipment and / or Critical 
System)
Condition of use or integrity 
(Physical Installation and / or 
Infrastructure Building)
Recovery Time 
Objectives or 
replacement 
(estimated)
RTO 
BCM 
Assessment 
Team (Table 
II of PCNRI)
Status and 
(Data)
Completed by:
 (Name and 
Registration 
Number)
Note relevant
Form 4 - Damage Assessment of Equipment or Critical Systems, Physical Installations and Infrastructure
Example 6.4 - Critical fault or total loss of 
Electrical Panel of the CNCO 
infraestructure (Headquarters or 
Backup) (A1 or A2)
UPS/"No Break" Room - 
CNCO Headquarters QFNB-1 - General Electrical 
Panel - "No Break-1" - Sl No 
Break - Underground
2 - damaged but usable, 
requires little maintenance 
(maintenance cost <10% of the 
replacement price)
1 - No damage 1 week Scada Team in progress Scada Leader hire service
LV.5.2.1 - LIST OF TASKS OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAM AND INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT - EADGI
Gather information about the incident from first-hand contact; with rescuers or duty 
personnel (fire brigade, maintenance, SMS, etc.), and other employees. Relays information 
to the Incident Management Team (EGI). (use Form 5)
Through the SMS representative, guide security actions to guarantee the physical integrity 
of the staff and other personnel involved in the event, as appropriate. 
Make an initial assessment of the incident´s likely impact on the  local operations  
activities, as defined in the BIA and Annex X. 
Establish and maintain communication with the Crisis Operations Center (COC), led by 
EGI. 
Provide conclusive data to the disaster declaration process (Forms 4 and 5). 
Provide report on the activities, post-event, following the model to be defined in Incident 
Recovery Planning process. (Use Forms 1, 4 and 5) 
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3.8. Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) 
Assure the effectiveness of the implementation and maintenance of the CNCO BCM program, a system to 
assess the management of BCM program. The Benchmark British Standards Institute's Good Practice Guide to 
Business Continuity Management (PAS 56) [6] and BS ISO 22313 [1] will be used as a baseline to assess the 
program. 
The Business Continuity Institute PAS 56 Audit Workbook enables organizations to undertake a self 
assessment benchmark against the British Standards Institute's Good Practice Guide to Business Continuity 
Management (PAS 56).  The workbook consists of a menu of questions (benchmark comparators) and a good 
practice compliance aggregation dashboard.  The benchmark comparators (both Process and Performance) are 
founded upon the BCI BCM Good Practice Guidelines Evaluation Criteria. 
The workbook consists of six scorecards (in addition to the introduction and user guidelines and instructions) 
that reflect the BCM lifecycle.  The questions and good practice compliance dashboard contained within each 
stage of the lifecycle enable the assessor to establish if an organization is using BCM good practice.
The workbook provides both a Good Practice Guidelines Process benchmark and a Performance benchmark 
within each of the six scorecards. 
All questions within the workbook must be answered and achieve the ‘green’ percentage level of compliance to 
achieve the BCI PAS 56 BCM Good Practice (Process and Performance) Audit Benchmark. 
The workbook will quickly establish the maturity of an organization’s BCM competence and capability.  The 
BCM maturity of an organization has a direct bearing on the ability to complete a part or the whole of the 
workbook.  
The workbook also provides a mechanism and process to monitor, track and progress Business Continuity and 
Crisis Management issues and actions identified by the assessment process. 
  
The workbook has six (6) objectives: 
1. To provide a BCM enabling benchmark tool. 
2. To enable CNCO to evaluate its current BCM competence and capability against the BSI PAS 56 BCM good 
practice evaluation benchmark (process and performance) criteria. 
3. The Provision of a consistent good practice benchmark (process and performance) and process to assess the 
maturity of CNCO's BCM competence and capability. 
4. To enable and inform the creation of CNCO's BCM management information dashboard of Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI's). 
5. The identification of gaps and hot spots in CNCO's BCM competence and capability. 
6. To clearly demonstrate and provide evidence that the CNCO is discharging its risk, legal, regulatory and 
corporate governance accountability and responsibilities. 
Figure 5. PAS 56 Components Radar Chart - Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) - CNCO 
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Figure 6. Sample of The Business Continuity Institute PAS 56 Audit Workbook 
4. Requirements identified by BCM Application in CNCO 
The development of the CNCO BCM program identified the following improvements that were already 
concluded or are in a development process. 
ƒ Applying a heuristic model for the evaluation of CNCO infrastructure maintenance management to attend the 
needs of centralized operation using the SCADA technology. 
ƒ Consolidation of the use of the concept of “Autonomic Management” and the development of SAG tool for 
monitoring "On Line", the infrastructure of SCADA and Telecommunication System. 
ƒ For the operation, to better assess the operational and procedural reliability, a benchmark study was made in 
2014 to assess workload (references: Pipeline American Companies). It was identified the need to review some 
executive processes (Ex. Pass Shift). It has been suggested to use references from NASA methodology / TLX 
(Task Load Index) and PHMSA regulatory body (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) to 
mitigate fatigue in Control Centers. It was also suggested to improve the alarm management program and to 
conduct a study of human reliability. 
ƒ Identification of priorities for risk analysis of telecommunication processes (Customer Flow development for 
Telecom services and formalization of Service Level Agreement - SLA). 
ƒ Develop improvement as protection against unauthorized access (hacking) and viruses (in progress). 
ƒ Perform critical analysis systematically to improve the transfer process of “hot” operation between CNCO 
headquarters in the center of Rio de Janeiro and CNCO Backup in Campos Eliseos. 
ƒ Effort to improve the management process of the SCADA System Maintenance: Heuristic model application 
for evaluation of this management (see figure 7 below). 
5. Maintenance Management Process of CNCO Scada System and Infrastructure. 
A Maturity Model to assess the Maintenance and Administration Management Process of SCADA Technology 
and physical and auxiliary infrastructure that makes up the CNCO [8] has been implemented. 
The figure 7 shows the graphic and the metrics of each part of the Scada System and its infrastructure: 
Benchmark - BS ISO 2231-3 - Business Continuity Management Systems — Guidance
Estage One - BCM PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT.
TRANSPETRO - CNCO - CENTRO NACIONAL DE CONTROLE OPERACIONAL 
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QUESTIONS
12 1,1
Does the CNCO have a clearly defined, 
documented and approved management 
process to manage its BCM programme? 1 1        100 0,08 8 100
1,2
Does the CNCO use the BSI PAS 56 as an 
integral part of its BCM programme? 1 1        100 0,08 8 100
Each Stage Section
Aggregate Dashboard.
Each Stage Section
Aggregate Dashboard.
1 1 BCM Programme Management 12 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 3          88 1,00 88 88
1 2 BCM Policy 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1        100 1,00 100 100
1 3 BCM Assurance 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1          98 1,00 98 98
Stage Aggregate Dashboard.
1 BCM Programme Management 12 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 3          88 0,33 29
2 BCM Policy 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1        100 0,33 33
3 BCM Assurance 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1          98 0,33 33
3 95
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Figure 7. The results of support infrastructure of CNCO SCADA system evaluation. 
6. Conclusion 
Through the BCMS, the organizational structure of CNCO can recognize what needs to be done before an 
incident occurs, and if it occurs, systematize how to treat and manage the incident, in order to protect people, 
business, technology, information, its supply chain, stakeholders and the company reputation. From this 
recognition, the organizational structure of CNCO may have a realistic view of the responses that could be 
implemented in the event of interruptions of its MCAs, with the BCM program the organization can be 
confident that will manage any of the consequences, within the scenarios raised without unnecessary delays in 
the delivery of its products and services. 
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4 - Optimized
3 - Managed
2 - Well 
Structured 
1 - Organized
0 - Informal
Continuous improvement and 
refinement of processes 
Consistent indicators and good. 
 Targets and plans based on data. 
 Integrated and aligned processes 
Standardized procedures. 
 Some degree of control. 
Beginning use of indicators
Main processes defined 
Insufficient knowledge of the 
process 
